Monday, March 3, 2008
Some history and analysis from Dore Gold: Israel's War to Halt Palestinian Rocket Attacks
- The Kassam rocket threat started in 2001 and grew when the Palestinian Authority was under Fatah control. Even after the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, Kassam rocket fire from Gaza continued under the regime of Mahmoud Abbas. True, Abbas called on Palestinians to stop firing rockets into Israel in 2006, but on the ground, he and the Fatah leadership were either unwilling or unable to halt the Hamas attacks as they increased
- After Israel's disengagement from Gaza, the number of confirmed rocket strikes against Israel increased by more than 500 percent. The 2005 Gaza disengagement provided Hamas with a sense of empowerment and self-confidence that led to a clear-cut escalation in the employment of the rocket capabilities that they had previously acquired.
- The disengagement from Gaza led to the loss of Israeli control over the Philadelphi route between the Gaza Strip and Egyptian Sinai, allowing for a significant increase in the range and quantity of rockets in the Palestinian arsenal. Prior to 2006, the number of Palestinian rocket attacks rarely reached 50 per month. By early 2008, Palestinian organizations displayed a capability of launching 50 rockets per day.
- Israeli security forces recently discovered in the western Negev the remains of a new 175 mm. rocket of Iranian origin that has a range of 26 kilometers. Israeli security sources are also concerned that Iran will try to smuggle its Fajr rockets to Gaza in the future. A 45-kilometer-range Fajr 3, for example, could be smuggled in sections and assembled in Gaza.
- As long as the Philadelphi route is open for Hamas smuggling, the risk to Israel will grow as Iran exports rockets of increasing range to the Gaza Strip. The port of Ashdod is the next likely target, but should Fajr rockets reach Gaza, there is no reason why Hamas cannot pose a threat to Tel Aviv. Control of the launch areas in northern Gaza could significantly reduce the ability of Hamas to harass Sderot and the communities of the western Negev with rocket and mortar fire. The repeated lesson of the last seven years is that only Israel can ultimately be responsible for its own security.
More.
You should point out that this is the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, and not the Jewish Council for Public Affairs that shamefully endorsed a two-state solution and consideration of the division of Jerusalem at the exact time that southern Israel is under incessant fire (see http://www.ou.org/public_affairs/article/clarification_ou_position_and_role_on_jcpa_resolution/)
there are key varibales missing here
for example the captured israiely soldier
and what happened after his capture(
israel failure war on lebenon
the rise of hamas and their election
the analysis focuses on the disengagement from gaza and makes it the most important factor which led to the increase of (fireworks) bieng fired at israel. which eventually leads to the analysis emplieng that any invasion of gaza is the right choice....which is really what is bieng pland for.
Yea, there are "key variables" missing, alright.
a-rab19, since "fireworks" are being fired at Israel, it's only fair that celebratory "fireworks" are returned to PaleSWINE.
Why should so-called PaleSWINIANS be denied the wonder of seeing "fireworks" explode in their community?
the analysis focuses on the disengagement from gaza and makes it the most important factor which led to the increase of (fireworks) bieng fired at israel. which eventually leads to the analysis emplieng that any invasion of gaza is the right choice....which is really what is bieng pland for.
If one nation, state, duchy or whatever is firing rockets at another nation, state, etc., that is an act of war. The group that's being fired upon has the right to respond.
If the Palestinians didn't want a war, they shouldn't have been firing those rockets.
And if this was somehow a part of a plan by Israel, then the Palestinians allowed themselves to be outsmarted. Their loss. Smoke and mirrors may fool the press, and it may help an incompetent army win a battle or two, but it can't win a war.