Wednesday, May 7, 2008
Fascinating recollections of Clark Clifford concerning the inside the White House story:
- President Truman regarded his Secretary of State, General of the Army George C. Marshall, as "the greatest living American." Yet the two men were on a collision course over Mideast policy. Marshall firmly opposed American recognition of the new Jewish state.
- Officials in the State Department had done everything in their power to prevent, thwart, or delay the President's Palestine policy in 1947 and 1948. Watching them find various ways to avoid carrying out White House instructions, I sometimes felt they preferred to follow the views of the British Foreign Office rather than those of their President.
- At a meeting in the Oval Office on May 12, 1948, I argued: "In an area as unstable as the Middle East, where there is not now and never has been any tradition of democratic government, it is important for the long-range security of our country, and indeed the world, that a nation committed to the democratic system be established there, one on which we can rely. The new Jewish state can be such a place. We should strengthen it in its infancy by prompt recognition."
- Since at the time a significant number of Jewish Americans opposed Zionism, neither the President nor I believed that Palestine was the key to the Jewish vote. As I had written in 1947, the key to the Jewish vote in 1948 would not be the Palestine issue, but a continued commitment to liberal political and economic policies.
- The charge that domestic politics determined our policy on Palestine angered President Truman for the rest of his life. In fact, the President's policy rested on the realities of the situation in the region, on America's moral, ethical, and humanitarian values, on the costs and risks inherent in any other course, and on America's national interests.
Clifford was a domestic adviser, and State opposed him, accusing him of pushing Truman to recognize the Jewish State for the sake of the Jewish vote. He denies this ever entered into the equation, even pointing out that many Jews opposed Zionism at that time. Perhaps Clifford simply had the concerns and values of Americans at heart, while the State Department was overly concerned with the opinions of their Arab interlocutors.
