There is a theory, popular with the foreign policy establishment, that the best way to defeat violent extremism, is to find people who are ideologically close to violent extremism, and do a deal with them. You find the sonuvabitch who is "our friend" and pit him against the sonuvabitch who is "our enemy". You install him in power. Big smiles for the press, handshakes all round. Then you walk away. When the whacking and chopping and mass murder starts, you shake your head in sorrow from behind your desk in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, relieved that it is now no longer "our problem".

That model doesn't work, as far as domestic politics are concerned. You can't "walk away" from the problems you create here. Britain is our home.

What made the Muslim Contact Unit's decision to partner with Islamists respectable, was the thesis that there is a "good Muslim Brotherhood" and a "bad Muslim Brotherhood". Robert Leiken of the Nixon Centre puts the theory well here:

It became clear that there were two main currents within the Muslim Brotherhood. Some members were reactionary and dogmatic, were probably anti-Semitic and certainly anti-Zionist, wanted Israel to vanish and made that a principle of their politics and world view. The Supreme Guide expresses such views. But we found those views to be a severe embarrassment to other leading Brothers. We talked to powerful Brotherhood leaders who took public positions extolling Jews. This trend seems to be on the ascent.

Leiken expounded his theory that the Muslim Brotherhood is a "safety valve for moderate Islam" at length in his article, The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood.

I think that Leiken is off his rocker, frankly.

I'd suggest that Islamists have three main aims in engaging with the British state.

The first is validation. Those involved in Islamist politics are narcissistic fantasists. They imagine themselves - like the Blues Brothers - to be on a "mission from God". Somebody like Azad Ali is, in reality, a middle aged civil servant. However it flatters him when senior civil servants and police officers treat him as somebody who matters, who is doing something meaningful and significant, and who should therefore be treated seriously, rather than laughed at as a crank.

Islamist groups also leverage validation by one organisation, to persuade others to treat them seriously. If the Metropolitian Police think you're a serious person, then an MP will speak at your conference. If an MP speaks at your conference, you're more likely to get an op ed in a mainstream newspaper. If you get your op ed, a senior judge is more likely to support you. That is the strategy. And, if somebody then points out that you've been calling for jihad, or support banned terrorist groups, the fact that you've got the backing of the Metropolitant Police, a mainstream newspaper, an MP, and a senior judge makes it easy for you to attack your opponent as a racist and Islamophobe who is trying to "smear" you.

The second aim is influence. There are prizes to be had for playing the game. As a reward for working with the Metropolitan Police, Bob Lambert's team installed the Muslim Brotherhood - in place of Abu Hamza - in the Finsbury Park Mosque. One of the trustees they put in place, Mohammed Sawalha, had been named by the BBC as a fugitive Hamas commander. Muslim Brotherhood front groups have been working hard to get their hands on a share of the Preventing Violent Extremism pot. In Tower Hamlets, they succeeded. They promptly used the money to stage a 'debate' between the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Muhajiroun and Hizb ut Tahrir.

But the rewards on offer are not simply monetary. What the Muslim Brotherhood dearly would love, is to be treated by the state as the rightful intermediary for British Muslims. They would like input into policy formation. They would like to be able to bargain with the Government, in the name of all British Muslims. In particular, they want to appear on television, deploring terrorism, but explaining that because the Government hasn't followed its sensible advice, there's nothing it can do to stop the young hotheads from blowing themselves up.

There's a telling phrase in Andy Hayman's op ed piece, and it is this. He argues that there is no point is building bridges with Muslims who are "safe but ... not really representative". I very much hope that what Andy Hayman means is that Islamists are 'representative' of those who are involved in, or supportive of, violent jihad: and not "representative" of British Muslims generally. The former interpretation is spot on: the latter is simply untrue. The danger we face, however, is that by treating Islamists as the legitimate representatives of British Muslims, we will have created a self-fulfilling prophecy. We will have made them kings of their communities. What do you think they will do with that influence?..

...If the police want to find Muslims to help them "deradicalise" potential jihadists, they should partner with those who have been jihadists, but have turned their back on that politics altogether: not individuals and groups which support terrorism in any country but ours.