Amazon.com Widgets

Wednesday, July 7, 2010

A must-read from Israeli-American Nobelist Robert Aumann: The Blackmailer Paradox - Game Theory and negotiations with Arab countries. Here's the scenario:

Reuben and Shimon are placed into a small room with a suitcase containing $100,000 of cash. The owner of the suitcase offers them the following: "I'll give you all the money in the suitcase, but only on the condition that you negotiate and reach an amicable agreement on its division. That's the only way I will give you the money. "

Reuben, who is a rational person, appreciates the golden opportunity presented to him and turns to Shimon with the obvious suggestion: "Come, you take half the amount, I'll take the other half, and each of us will go away with $50,000." To his surprise, Shimon, with a serious look on his face and a determined voice says: "Listen, I do not know what your intentions are with the money, but I'm not leaving this room with less than $90,000. Take it or leave it. I'm fully prepared to go home with nothing."

Reuben can not believe his ears. What happened to Shimon? he thinks to himself. Why should he get 90%, and I only 10%? He decides to try to talk to Shimon. "Come, be reasonable," he pleads. "We're both in this together, and we both want the money. Come let's share the amount equally and we'll both come out ahead."

But the reasoned explanation of his friend does not seem to register on Shimon. He listens attentively to Reuben's words, but then declares even more emphatically, "There is nothing to discuss. 90-10 or nothing, that's my final offer!" Reuben's face turns red with anger. He wants to smack Shimon across his face, but soon reconsiders. He realizes that Shimon is determined to leave with the majority of the money, and that the only way for him to leave the room with any money is to surrender to Shimon's blackmail. He straightens his clothes, pulls out a wad of bills from the suitcase in the amount of $10,000, shakes hands with Shimon and leaves the room looking forlorn.

This case in Game Theory is called the "Blackmailer Paradox." The paradox emerging from this case is that the rational Reuben is eventually forced to act clearly irrationally, in order to gain the maximum available to him. The logic behind this bizarre result is that Shimon broadcast total faith and confidence in his excessive demands, and he is able to convince Reuben to yield to his blackmail in order for him to receive the minimum benefit...

How does this apply to the Arab-Israeli conflict?

The political relationship between Israel and Arab countries is also conducted according to the principles of this paradox. The Arabs present rigid and unreasonable opening positions at every negotiation. They convey confidence and assurance in their demands, and make certain to make absolutely clear to Israel that they will never give up on any of these requirements.

Be sure to read the rest.

The trouble for Israel in applying the lessons of this thought experiment is that they have not only their own fifth column, but so-called "friends" in the governments of other countries and lobbying groups like J Street who basically take Shimon's part in the negotiation.

[h/t: Seva]

1 Comment

There's more to it than that, just as there's more to the Prisoners' Dilemma than meets the eye.

In particular, there's a difference if the transaction is a one-shot or an iterated event. Suppose Shimon and Reuven are repeatedly (perhaps irregularly) called into a room, and from time to time offered the same deal -- $100,000 to the both of you, but only if you agree completely on the split.

In the iterated case, it makes sense for Reuven, having been through this once before, to refuse to give in. He'll walk out with nothing, as will Shimon. Unless he really needs the money, Reuven may well take the long view, and bet against the hope that, some day, Shimon will get tired of nothing and agree to a more equitable split.

(For more on the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma, and the surprising solution to it, check this out.)

The difference between this and the Prisoners' Dilemma is that, in this case, Reuven and Shimon don't have an equal ability to cheat each other. What they do have is veto power -- I can cause you to walk out of here with nothing, any time I want, just by saying "no"... provided I'm willing to walk out with nothing as well.

What happens if Reuven doesn't really need the $10,000 -- and, as such, is in a good position to refuse Shimon's deal -- but thinks that he does need it? That's basically the situation Israel is in, giving in to blackmail again and again when the smart move would be to stand pat.

I've written all this without reading Mr. Aumann's analysis... which probably makes my thoughts seem trivial. I'll go read that now.

DiB

[an error occurred while processing this directive]

[an error occurred while processing this directive]

Search


Archives
[an error occurred while processing this directive] [an error occurred while processing this directive]