Monday, August 4, 2003
The goal of the planning should be to be prepared on short notice both to destroy the nuclear capabilities at Yongbyon and other key North Korean facilities and to protect South Korea against attack by destroying North Korean artillery and missile sites. Our stealth aircraft, equipped with precision bombs, and cruise missiles will be crucial--these weapons can be tailored to incinerate the WMD and minimize radiation leakage.
The key point is that the base infrastructure available in the region and the accessibility of North Korea from the sea should make it possible to generate around 4,000 sorties a day compared to the 800 a day that were so effective in Iraq. When one contemplates that the vast majority of these sorties would use precision munitions, and that surveillance aircraft would permit immediate targeting of artillery pieces and ballistic missile launch sites, we believe the use of air power in such a war would be swifter and more devastating than it was in Iraq. North Korea's geriatric air defenses--both fighter aircraft and missiles--would not last long. As the Iraqis understood when facing our air power, if you fly, you die.
Marine forces deployed off both coasts of North Korea could put both Pyongyang and Wonson at risk of rapid seizure, particularly given the fact that most of North Korea's armed forces are situated along the DMZ. With over 20 of the Army's 33 combat brigades now committed it would be necessary to call up additional Reserve and National Guard units. However, the U.S. forces that would have the greatest immediate effect are Expeditionary Air Forces and Carrier Battle Groups, most of which have now been removed from the Iraqi theater...
Impression: Woolsey and McInerney believe that, should China fail to push for regime-change in North Korea, we can and should fight a hot war to remove Kim. They leave out one factor, and that is that the South Koreans agree, and I haven't heard any indication that they do.
It's a relatively rosy picture they paint - one of a quick war and minimal losses to the South. I sincerely doubt we're close to re-starting the Korean War right now. In spite of the fact that everyone imagines the USA is all about pre-emptive wars, our resources (both military, financial and diplomatic) are not limitless. It's going to take some more of an overt provocation on the part of the DPRK, or a lot more laying of diplomatic groundwork on our part for anything like what this article calls for happens.
It's been ten years, but I participated in a couple of major gaming exercises on Korean conflict. Woolsey's and McInerney's picture is a rosy one. The force structure they allude to is not in theater and would require a massive build-up to augment current Order of Battle. Any hot war in Korea, almost certainly, would not be as sterile and light on casualties as the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It may reach the point where it's the right thing to do, but we're not there yet. The American people will need to be more supportive of War in Korea than they were/are in Iraq... again we have a long way to go on that one.
Thanks. It's nice to have some expert input. It certainly seems to me that even seemingly minor troop deployments are preceded by large build-ups and it would surprise me if we actually kept enough force on hand at all times to go on the offensive in Korea. Further, in spite of what some people think, we're just not war-like people. There needs to be some sort of psychological build-up as well.