In the summer of 2003, I served as Chief of Staff in the Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), an organization formerly called the Ministry of Atomic Energy. The Ministry had a small staff of Americans and Iraqis, and was one of several ministries of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Baghdad. One of our key tasks was to transition several thousand Iraqi scientists and engineers from military and state-owned enterprises to private enterprises involved in more peaceful endeavors. Working there, I enjoyed a unique vantage point on the activities of the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG), the inspection agency headed by Dr. David Kay, charged with finding WMD. Dr. Kay’s recent report and his testimony before Congress have helped fuel flames of criticism of the Bush Administration, and of 12 years of prewar intelligence on Iraq.

We at the MOST were a vital link in the WMD reporting chain, and in coordinating interviews by the ISG with the scientists of the ministry. In addition, we had resident scientific and technical expertise, and some of our people also had extensive experience working with intelligence organizations in the conduct of tactical ground and maritime reconnaissance operations. Based on this background, I want to report to my fellow Americans on some of the problems and missed opportunities I observed in the work of the ISG. In doing so, I speak only for myself, not for my colleagues, or for any organ of the CPA, or for any agency of the United States Government...