Friday, July 23, 2004
After putting up the entry below, I've found myself pulled in by the report. I thought it would be dry and difficult, but it isn't. It is business-like, but riveting. I've been tempted to excerpt and post paragraphs here and there, but wasn't sure it would be worth it. I'm not a fast reader generally, and I find reading a lengthy document on a computer screen to be particularly tedious. I figure by the time I get through it - if I get through it - there will be plenty of entries out there with real analysis attached. I'm sort of skimming along as I can, so it will be slow in coming.
Nevertheless, I can't help putting up just a few excerpts as I go. I guess that's blogging for you. Not sure how much I'll do this, but here we go:
The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minutes’ notice on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth.
We do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects discredit on the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities. NEADS commanders and officers actively sought out information, and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what they knew. Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and Command Center managers thought outside the box in recommending a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping local traffic, and, ultimately, in deciding to land all aircraft and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly.
