Tuesday, April 10, 2007
I know that some people think that being firmer on Iran would have just strengthened the hardliners against the "moderates" (whatever that actually means within Iran's power structure), but the hardliners won either way. Either the West came with a firm response and, according to this theory, strengthened the hardliners, or, as happened, the West came in weak, the hardliners ran things any way they wanted and emerged tweaking Britain's nose, weakening the transatlantic alliance, gaining prestige for themselves among themselves and showing-up the "moderates" by demonstrating that the West is utterly powerless.
Emboldened as Iran now is, and ironically for engagement advocates, it is even less likely there will be a negotiated solution to the nuclear weapons issue, not that there was ever much chance of one. Iran, sensing weakness, has every incentive to ratchet up its nuclear weapons programme, increase its support to Hamas, Hizbollah and others and perpetrate even more serious terrorism in Iraq. The world will be a more dangerous place as a result. Evidence may already be at hand in the deaths of four British soldiers in Basra on Friday.
Quite possibly, the Iranians were divided internally and may well have stumbled into success at the end. This has already inspired the media's commentariat to conclude that the Foreign Office's "softly softly" approach worked. The Captain Ahabs of British and US diplomacy, obsessed by their search for Iranian "moderates", those great white whales, are proclaiming yet another "moderate" victory in this outcome. Surely, the "moderates" prevailed; how else to explain the hostages' release?
Indisputably the winners in Iran were the hardliners. It was Mr Ahmadi-Nejad who stood in the international spotlight for hours on end, who awarded medals to the Revolutionary Guards who captured the hostages, who announced the hostages' release and accepted their thanks. Even if the moderates concurred in the outcome, divergent motives can lead to the same conclusion. The question is, who increased relative to others in the Iranian calculus of power? The evidence unmistakably points to Mr Ahmadi-Nejad. If strengthening his hand within the Tehran leadership amounts to success for British diplomacy and Iranian moderates, one hesitates to ask what would constitute failure...